Republic of Macedonia


 This speech was delivered about three months after the last,
while Philip was advancing into Thrace, and threatening both
the Chersonese and the Propontine coast. No new event had
happened, which called for any special consultation; but
Demosthenes, alarmed by the formidable character of Philip's
enterprises and vast military preparations, felt the necessity
of rousing the Athenians to exertion. He repeats in substance
the arguments which he had used in the Oration on the
Chersonese; points out the danger to be apprehended from the
disunion among the Greek states, from their general apathy
and lack of patriotism, which he contrasts with the high and
noble spirit of ancient times. From the past conduct of Philip
he shows what is to be expected in future; explains the
difference between Philip's new method of warfare and that
adopted in the Peloponnesian war, and urges the necessity of
corresponding measures for defense. The peaceful professions
of Philip were not to be trusted; he was never more dangerous
than when he made overtures of peace and friendship. The most
powerful instruments that he employed for gaining ascendency
were the venal orators, who were to be found in every Grecian
city, and on whom it was necessary to inflict signal punishment,
before they had a chance of opposing foreign enemies. The advice
of Demosthenes now is, to dispatch reinforcements to the
Chersonese, to stir up the people of Greece, and even to solicit
the assistance of the Persian king, who had no less reason than
themselves to dread the ambition of Philip.

The events of the following year, when Philip attacked the
Propontine cities, fully justified the warning of Demosthenes.
And the extraordinary activity, which the Athenians displayed
in resisting him, shows that the exertions of the orator had
their due effect. Even Mitford confesses, with reference to the
operations of that period, that Athens found in Demosthenes an
able and effective minister.

Many speeches, men of Athens, are made in almost every assembly about
the hostilities of Philip, hostilities which ever since the treaty of
peace he has been committing as well against you as against the rest of
the Greeks; and all (I am sure) are ready to avow, though they forbear
to do so, that our counsels and our measures should be directed to his
humiliation and chastisement: nevertheless, so low have our affairs been
brought by inattention and negligence, I fear it is a harsh truth to
say, that if all the orators had sought to suggest, and you to pass
resolutions for the utter ruining of the commonwealth, we could not
methinks be worse off than we are. A variety of circumstances may have
brought us to this state; our affairs have not declined from one or two
causes only; but, if you rightly examine, you will find it chiefly owing
to the orators, who study to please you rather than advise for the best.
Some of whom, Athenians, seeking to maintain the basis of their own
power and repute, have no forethought for the future, and therefore
think you also ought to have none; others, accusing and calumniating
practical statesmen, labor only to make Athens punish Athens, and in
such occupations to engage her, that Philip may have liberty to say and
do what he pleases. Politics of this kind are common here, but are the
causes of your failures and embarrassment. I beg, Athenians, that you
will not resent my plain speaking of the truth. Only consider. You hold
liberty of speech in other matters to be the general right of all
residents in Athens, insomuch that you allow a measure of it even to
foreigners and slaves, and many servants may be seen among you speaking

their thoughts more freely than citizens in some other states; and yet
you have altogether banished it from your councils. The result has been,
that in the assembly you give yourselves airs and are flattered at
hearing nothing but compliments, in your measures and proceedings you
are brought to the utmost peril. If such be your disposition now, I must
be silent: if you will listen to good advice without flattery, I am
ready to speak. For though our affairs are in a deplorable condition,
though many sacrifices have been made, still, if you will choose to
perform your duty, it is possible to repair it all. A paradox, and yet a
truth, am I about to state. That which is the most lamentable in the
past is best for the future. How is this? Because you performed no part
of your duty, great or small, and therefore you fared ill: had you done
all that became you, and your situation were the same, there would be no
hope of amendment. Philip has indeed prevailed over your sloth and
negligence, but not over the country: you have not been worsted; you
have not even bestirred yourselves.

If now we were all agreed that Philip is at war with Athens and
infringing the peace, nothing would a speaker need to urge or advise but
the safest and easiest way of resisting him. But since, at the very time
when Philip is capturing cities and retaining divers of our dominions
and assailing all people, there are men so unreasonable as to listen to
repeated declarations in the assembly, that some of us are kindling war,
one must be cautious and set this matter right: for whoever moves or
advises a measure of defense, is in danger of being accused afterward as
author of the war.

I will first then examine and determine this point, whether it be in our
power to deliberate on peace or war. If the country may be at peace, if
it depends on us, (to begin with this,) I say we ought to maintain
peace, and I call upon the affirmant to move a resolution, to take some
measure, and not to palter with us. But if another, having arms in his
hand and a large force around him, amuses you with the name of peace,
while he carries on the operations of war, what is left but to defend
yourselves? You may profess to be at peace, if you like, as he does; I
quarrel not with that. But if any man supposes this to be a peace, which
will enable Philip to master all else and attack you last, he is a
madman, or he talks of a peace observed toward him by you, not toward
you by him. This it is that Philip purchases by all his expenditure, the
privilege of assailing you without being assailed in turn.

If we really wait until he avows that he is at war with us, we are the
simplest of mortals, for he would not declare that, though he marched
even against Attica and Piraeus, at least if we may judge from his
conduct to others. For example, to the Olynthians he declared, when he
was forty furlongs from their city, that there was no alternative, but
either they must quit Olynthus or he Macedonia; though before that time,
whenever he was accused of such an intent, he took it ill and sent
embassadors to justify himself. Again, he marched towards the Phocions
as if they were allies, and there were Phocian envoys who accompanied
his march, and many among you contended that his advance would not
benefit the Thebans. And he came into Thessaly of late as a friend and
ally, yet he has taken possession of Pherae: and lastly he told these
wretched people of Oreus, [Footnote: When he established his creature
Philistides in the government of Oreus, as mentioned in the last oration
and at the end of this.] that he had sent his soldiers out of good-will
to visit them, as he heard they were in trouble and dissension, and it
was the part of allies and true friends to lend assistance on such
occasions. People who would never have harmed him, though they might
have adopted measures of defense, he chose to deceive rather than warn
them of his attack; and think ye he would declare war against you before
he began it, and that while you are willing to be deceived? Impossible.
He would be the silliest of mankind, if, while you the injured parties
make no complaint against him, but are accusing your own countrymen, he

should terminate your intestine strife and jealousies, warn you to turn
against him, and remove the pretexts of his hirelings for asserting, to
amuse you, that he makes no war upon Athens. O heavens! would any
rational being judge by words rather than by actions, who is at peace
with him and who at war? Surely none. Well then; Philip immediately
after the peace, before Diopithes was in command or the settlers in the
Chersonese had been sent out, took Serrium and Doriscus, and expelled
from Serrium and the Sacred Mount the troops whom your general had
stationed there. [Footnote: This general was Chares, to whom
Cersobleptes had intrusted the defense of those places. The Sacred Mount
was a fortified position on the northern coast of the Hellespont. It was
here that Miltocythes intrenched himself, when he rebelled against
Cotys; and Philip took possession of it just before the peace with
Athens was concluded, as being important to his operations against
Cersobleptes. The statement of Demosthenes, that the oaths had then been
taken, is, as Jacobs observes, incorrect; for they were sworn afterward
in Thessaly. But the argument is substantially the same, for the peace
had been agreed to, and the ratification was purposely delayed by
Philip, to gain time for the completion of his designs.] What do you
call such conduct? He had sworn the peace. Don't say--what does it
signify? how is the state concerned?--Whether it be a trifling matter,
or of no concernment to you, is a different question: religion and
justice have the same obligation, be the subject of the offense great or
small. Tell me now; when he sends mercenaries into Chersonesus, which
the king and all the Greeks have acknowledged to be yours, when he avows
himself an auxiliary and writes us word so, what are such proceedings?
He says he is not at war; I can not however admit such conduct to be an
observance of the peace; far otherwise: I say, by his attempt on Megara,
[Footnote: Not long before this oration was delivered, Philip was
suspected of a design to seize Megara. Demosthenes gives an account, in
his speech on the Embassy, of a conspiracy between two Megarians,
Ptaeodorus and Perilaus, to introduce Macedonian troops into the city.
Phocion was sent by the Athenians to Megara, with the consent of the
Megarian people, to protect them against foreign attack. He fortified
the city and port, connecting them by long walls, and put them in
security. The occupation of Megara by Philip must have been most
perilous to Athens, especially while Euboea and Thebes were in his
interest; he would thus have inclosed her as it were in a net.] by his
setting up despotism in Euboea, by his present advance into Thrace, by
his intrigues in Peloponnesus, by the whole course of operations with
his army, he has been breaking the peace and making war upon you; unless
indeed you will say, that those who establish batteries are not at war,
until they apply them to the walls. But that you will not say: for
whoever contrives and prepares the means for my conquest, is at war with
me, before he darts or draws the bow. What, if any thing should happen,
is the risk you run? The alienation of the Hellespont, the subjection of
Megara and Euboea to your enemy, the siding of the Peloponnesians with
him. Then can I allow, that one who sets such an engine at work against
Athens is at peace with her? Quite the contrary. From the day that he
destroyed the Phocians I date his commencement of hostilities. Defend
yourselves instantly, and I say you will be wise: delay it, and you may
wish in vain to do so hereafter. So much do I dissent from your other
counselors, men of Athens, that I deem any discussion about Chersonesus
or Byzantium out of place. Succor them--I advise that--watch that no
harm befalls them, send all necessary supplies to your troops in that
quarter; but let your deliberations be for the safety of all Greece, as
being in the utmost peril. I must tell you why I am so alarmed at the
state of our affairs: that, if my reasonings are correct, you may share
them, and make some provision at least for yourselves, however
disinclined to do so for others: but if, in your judgment, I talk
nonsense and absurdity, you may treat me as crazed, and not listen to
me, either now or in future.

That Philip from a mean and humble origin has grown mighty, that the Greeks are jealous and quarreling among themselves, that it was far more
wonderful for him to rise from that insignificance, than it would now
be, after so many acquisitions, to conquer what is left; these and
similar matters, which I might dwell upon, I pass over. But I observe
that all people, beginning with you, have conceded to him a right, which
in former times has been the subject of contest in every Grecian war.
And what is this? The right of doing what he pleases, openly fleecing
and pillaging the Greeks, one after another, attacking and enslaving
their cities. You were at the head of the Greeks for seventy-three
years, [Footnote: This would be from about the end of the Persian war to
the end of the Peloponnesian, B. C. 405. Isocrates speaks of the Athenian
sway as having lasted sixty-five or seventy years. But statements of
this kind are hardly intended to be made with perfect accuracy. In the
third Olynthiac, as we have seen, Demosthenes says, the Athenians had
the leadership by _consent of the Greeks_ for forty-five years.
This would exclude the Peloponnesian war.] the Lacedaemonians for
twenty-nine; [Footnote: From the end of the Peloponnesian war to the
battle of Naxos, B. C. 376.] and the Thebans had some power in these
latter times after the battle of Leuctra. Yet neither you, my
countrymen, nor Thebans nor Lacedaemonians, were ever licensed by the
Greeks to act as you pleased; far otherwise. When you, or rather the
Athenians at that time, appeared to be dealing harshly with certain
people, all the rest, even such as had no complaint against Athens,
thought proper to side with the injured parties in a war against her.
So, when the Lacedaemonians became masters and succeeded to your empire,
on their attempting to encroach and make oppressive innovations,
[Footnote: The Spartans, whose severe military discipline rendered them
far the best soldiers in Greece, were totally unfit to manage the
empire, at the head of which they found themselves after the humiliation
of Athens. Their attempt to force an oligarchy upon every dependent
state was an unwise policy, which made them generally odious. The
decemvirates of Lysander, and the governors ([Greek: _armostai_])
established in various Greek cities to maintain Lacedaemonian influence,
were regarded as instruments of tyranny. It was found that Spartan
governors and generals, when away from home, gave loose to their vicious
inclinations, as if to indemnify themselves for the strictness of
domestic discipline. It became a maxim in their politics, that the end
justified the means. The most flagrant proof was given by the seizure of
the Cadmea at Thebes; a measure, which led to a formidable confederacy
against Sparta, and brought her to the verge of destruction.] a general
war was declared against them, even by such as had no cause of
complaint. But wherefore mention other people? We ourselves and the
Lacedaemonians, although at the outset we could not allege any natural
injuries, thought proper to make war for the injustice that we saw done
to our neighbors. Yet all the faults committed by the Spartans in those
thirty years, and by our ancestors in the seventy, are less, men of
Athens, than the wrongs which, in thirteen incomplete years that Philip
has been uppermost, [Footnote: _I. e._ in power; but, as Smead, an
American editor, truly observes, [Greek: _epipolyxei_] has a
contemptuous signification, Jacobs: _oben schwimmt_. The thirteen
years are reckoned from the time when Philip's interference in Thessaly
began; before which he had not assumed an important character in
southern Greece.] he has inflicted on the Greeks: nay they are scarcely
a fraction of these, as may easily be shown in a few words. Olynthus and
Methone and Apollonia, and thirty-two cities [Footnote: The Chalcidian
cities.] on the borders of Thrace, I pass over; all which he has so
cruelly destroyed, that a visitor could hardly tell if they were ever
inhabited: and of the Phocians, so considerable a people exterminated, I
say nothing. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not taken
away her constitutions and her cities, and established tetrarchies, to
parcel her out, [Footnote: This statement does not disagree with the
mention of the [Greek: _dekadarchia_] in the second Philippic.
Supposing that Thessaly was not only divided into tetrarchics, four
provinces or cantons, but also governed by decemvirates of Philip's appointment, placed in divers of her cities, then by the former
contrivance she might be said [Greek: _donlenein kat ethnae_], by
the latter [Greek: _kata poleis_]. It is not clear indeed whether
several decemvirates, or one for the whole country, is to be understood.
The singular number is equally capable of either interpretation.] not
only by cities, but also by provinces, for subjection? Are not the
Euboean states governed now by despots, and that in an island near to
Thebes and Athens? Does he not expressly write in his epistles, "I am at
peace with those who are willing to obey me?" Nor does he write so and
not act accordingly. He is gone to the Hellespont; he marched formerly
against Ambracia; Elis, such an important city in Peloponnesus, he
possesses; [Footnote: That is to say; a Macedonian faction prevailed in
Elis. The democratical party had some time before endeavored to regain
the ascendency, by aid of the Phocian mercenaries of Phalaecus; but they
had been defeated by the troops of Arcadia and Elis.] he plotted lately
to get Megara: neither Hellenic nor Barbaric land contains the man's
ambition. [Footnote: So Juvenal, Sat X. 160:

Aestuat infelix angusto limite mundi,
Ut Gyarae clausus scopulis parvaque Seripho.

And Virgil, Aen. IX. 644:

Nee te Troja capit.]

And we the Greek community, seeing and hearing this, instead of sending
embassies to one another about it and expressing indignation, are in
such a miserable state, so intrenched in our miserable towns, that to
this day we can attempt nothing that interest or necessity requires; we
can not combine, or form any association for succor and alliance; we
look unconcernedly on the man's growing power, each resolving (methinks)
to enjoy the interval that another is destroyed in, not caring or
striving for the salvation of Greece: for none can be ignorant, that
Philip, like some course or attack of fever or other disease, is coming
even on those that yet seem very far removed. And you must be sensible,
that whatever wrong the Greeks sustained from Lacedaemonians or from us,
was at least inflicted by genuine people of Greece; and it might be felt
in the same manner as if a lawful son, born to a large fortune,
committed some fault or error in the management of it; on that ground
one would consider him open to censure and reproach, yet it could not be
said that he was an alien, and not heir to the property which he so
dealt with. But if a slave or a spurious child wasted and spoiled what
he had no interest in--Heavens! how much more heinous and hateful would
all have pronounced it! And yet in regard to Philip and his conduct they
feel not this, although he is not only no Greek and noway akin to
Greeks, but not even a barbarian of a place honorable to mention; in
fact, a vile fellow of Macedon, from which a respectable slave could not
be purchased formerly.

What is wanting to make his insolence complete? Besides his destruction
of Grecian cities, does he not hold the Pythian games, the common
festival of Greece, and, if he comes not himself, send his vassals to
preside? Is he not master of Thermopylae and the passes into Greece, and
holds he not those places by garrisons and mercenaries? Has he not
thrust aside Thessalians, ourselves, Dorians, the whole Amphictyonic
body, and got preaudience of the oracle, [Footnote: This privilege,
which had belonged to the Phocians, was transferred to Philip. It was
considered an advantage as well as an honor in ancient times; for there
were only certain days appointed in every month, when the oracle could
be consulted, and the order of consultation was determined by lot in
common cases. The Delphians used to confer the right of pre-consultation
on particular states or persons as a reward for some service or act of
piety. Thus the Spartans received it; and Croesus, king of Lydia, for
the magnificent presents which he sent to the temple.] to which even the Greeks do not all pretend? Does he not write to the Thessalians, what
form of government to adopt? send mercenaries to Porthmus, [Footnote:
Porthmus was the port of Eretria, on the strait, opposite Athens. The
circumstances are stated by Demosthenes at the latter end of the speech.
By expelling the [Greek: _daemos_] of Eretria, he means of course
the popular party, _die Volkspartei_, as Pabst has it; but they
would by their own partisans be called the people.] to expel the
Eretrian commonalty; others to Oreus, to set up Philistides as ruler?
Yet the Greeks endure to see all this; methinks they view it as they
would a hailstorm, each praying that it may not fall on himself, none
trying to prevent it. And not only are the outrages which he docs to
Greece submitted to, but even the private wrongs of every people:
nothing can go beyond this! Has he not wronged the Corinthians by
attacking Ambracia [Footnote: Divers colonies were planted on the
northwestern coast of Greece by the Corinthians, and also by the
Coreyraeans, who were themselves colonists from Corinth. Among them were
Leucas, Ambracia, Anactorium, Epidamnus, and Apollonia. Leucas afterward
became insular, by cutting through the isthmus. Philip's meditated
attack was in 343 B. C. after the conquest of Cassopia. Leucas, by its
insular position, would have been convenient for a descent on
Peloponnesus. We have seen that this design of Philip was baffled by the
exertions of Demosthenes.] and Leucas? the Achaians, by swearing to give
Naupactus [Footnote: Naupactus, now _Lepanto_, lay on the northern
coast of the Corinthian gulf. At the close of the Peloponnesian war it
came into the hands of the Achaians, from whom it was taken by
Epaminondas, but after his death they regained it. The Aetolians got
possession of the town some time after, perhaps by Macedonian
assistance.] to the Aetolians? from the Thebans taken Echinus?
[Footnote: The Echinus here mentioned was a city on the northern coast
of the Maliac gulf in Thessaly.] Is he not marching against the
Byzantines his allies? From us--I omit the rest--but keeps he not
Cardia, the greatest city of the Chersonese? Still under these
indignities we are all slack and disheartened, and look toward our
neighbors, distrusting one another, instead of the common enemy. And how
think ye a man, who behaves so insolently to all, how will he act, when
he gets each separately under his control?

But what has caused the mischief? There must be some cause, some good
reason, why the Greeks were so eager for liberty then, and now are eager
for servitude. There was something, men of Athens, something in the
hearts of the multitude then, which there is not now, which overcame the
wealth of Persia and maintained the freedom of Greece, and quailed not
under any battle by land or sea; the loss whereof has ruined all, and
thrown the affairs of Greece into confusion. What was this? Nothing
subtle or clever: simply that whoever took money from the aspirants for
power or the corruptors of Greece were universally detested: it was
dreadful to be convicted of bribery; the severest punishment was
inflicted on the guilty, and there was no intercession or pardon. The
favorable moments for enterprise, which fortune frequently offers to the
careless against the vigilant, to them that will do nothing against
those that discharge all their duty, could not be bought from orators or
generals; no more could mutual concord, nor distrust of tyrants and
barbarians, nor any thing of the kind. But now all such principles have
been sold as in open market, and those imported in exchange, by which
Greece is ruined and diseased. [Footnote: [Greek: _Apolole_] in
reference to foreign affairs; [Greek: _nenosaeken_] in regard to
internal broils and commotions. Compare Shakspeare, Macbeth IV. 8.

O nation miserable,
When shalt thou see thy wholesome days again?]

What are they? Envy where a man gets a bribe; laughter if he confesses
it; mercy to the convicted; hatred of those that denounce the crime: all
the usual attendants upon corruption. [Footnote: He glances more particularly at Philocrates, Demades, and Aeschines.] For as to ships
and men and revenues and abundance of other materials, all that may be
reckoned as constituting national strength--assuredly the Greeks of our
day are more fully and perfectly supplied with such advantages than
Greeks of the olden time. But they are all rendered useless,
unavailable, unprofitable, by the agency of these traffickers.

That such is the present state of things, you must see, without
requiring my testimony: that it was different in former times, I will
demonstrate, not by speaking my own words, but by showing an inscription
of your ancestors, which they graved on a brazen column and deposited in
the citadel, not for their own benefit, (they were right-minded enough
without such records,) but for a memorial and example to instruct you,
how seriously such conduct should be taken up. What says the inscription
then? It says: "Let Arthmius, son of Pythonax the Zelite, [Footnote:
Zelea is a town in Mysia. Arthmius was sent by Artaxerxes into
Peloponnesus, to stir up a war against the Athenians, who had irritated
him by the assistance which they lent to Egypt. Aeschines says that
Arthmius was the [Greek: _proxenos_] of Athens, which may partly
account for the decree passed against him.] be declared an outlaw,
[Footnote: Of the various degrees of [Greek: _atimia_] at Athens I
shall speak hereafter. I translate the word here, so as to meet the case
of a foreigner, who had nothing to do with the franchises of the
Athenians, but who by their decree was excommunicated from the benefit
of all international law.] and an enemy of the Athenian people and their
allies, him and his family." Then the cause is written why this was
done: because he brought the Median gold into Peloponnesus. That is the
inscription. By the gods! only consider and reflect among yourselves,
what must have been the spirit, what the dignity of those Athenians who
acted so! One Arthmius a Zelite, subject of the king, (for Zelea is in
Asia,) because in his master's service he brought gold into
Peloponnesus, not to Athens, they proclaimed an enemy of the Athenians
and their allies, him and his family, and outlawed. That is, not the
outlawry commonly spoken of: for what would a Zelite care, to be
excluded from Athenian franchises? It means not that; but in the
statutes of homicide it is written, in cases where a prosecution for
murder is not allowed, but killing is sanctioned, "and let him die an
outlaw," says the legislator: by which he means, that whoever kills such
a person shall be unpolluted. [Footnote: That is, his act being
justifiable homicide, he shall not be deemed (in a religious point of
view) impure. As to the Athenian law of homicide, see my article
_Phonos_ in the Archaeological Dictionary.] Therefore they
considered that the preservation of all Greece was their own concern:
(but for such opinion, they would not have cared, whether people in
Peloponnesus were bought and corrupted:) and whomsoever they discovered
taking bribes, they chastised and punished so severely as to record
their names in brass. The natural result was, that Greece, was
formidable to the Barbarian, not the Barbarian to Greece. 'Tis not so
now: since neither in this nor in other respects are your sentiments the
same. But what are they? You know yourselves: why am I to upbraid you
with every thing? The Greeks in general are alike and no better than
you. Therefore I say, our present affairs demand earnest attention and
wholesome counsel. Shall I say what? Do you bid me, and won't you be

[_Here is read the public document which Demosthenes produces, after
which he resumes his address_.]

[Footnote: The Secretary of the Assembly stood by the side of the
orator, and read any public documents, such as statutes, decrees, bills
and the like, which the orator desired to refer to or to verify. It does
not appear what the document was, which Demosthenes caused to be read
here. If we may judge from the argument, it was some energetic
resolution of the people, such as he would propose for an example on the present occasion.]

There is a foolish saying of persons who wish to make us easy, that
Philip is not yet as powerful as the Lacedaemonians were formerly, who
ruled every where by land and sea, and had the king for their ally, and
nothing withstood them; yet Athens resisted even that nation, and was
not destroyed. I myself believe, that, while every thing has received
great improvement, and the present bears no resemblance to the past,
nothing has been so changed and improved as the practice of war. For
anciently, as I am informed, the Lacedaemonians and all Grecian people
would for four or five months, during the season [Footnote: The
campaigning season, during the summer and fine time of the year. The
Peloponnesians generally invaded Attica when the corn was ripe, burning
and plundering all in their route. Thucydides in his history divides the
year into two parts, summer and winter.] only, invade and ravage the
land of their enemies with heavy-armed and national troops, and return
home again: and their ideas were so old-fashioned, or rather national,
they never purchased [Footnote: Compare the old lines of Ennius:

Non cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes
Ferro, non auro, vitam cernamus utrique.]

an advantage from any; theirs was a legitimate and open warfare. But now
you doubtless perceive, that the majority of disasters have been
effected by treason; nothing is done in fair field or combat. You hear
of Philip marching where he pleases, not because he commands troops of
the line, but because he has attached to him a host of skirmishers,
cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and the like. When with these he falls
upon a people in civil dissension, and none (for mistrust) will march
out to defend the country, he applies engines and besieges them. I need
not mention, that he makes no difference between winter and summer, that
he has no stated season of repose. You, knowing these things, reflecting
on them, must not let the war approach your territories, nor get your
necks broken, relying on the simplicity of the old war with the
Lacedaemonians, but take the longest time beforehand for defensive
measures and preparations, see that he stirs not from home, avoid any
decisive engagement. For a war, if we choose, men of Athens, to pursue a
right course, we have many natural advantages; such as the position of
his kingdom, which we may extensively plunder and ravage, and a thousand
more; but for a battle he is better trained than we are. [Footnote:
Chaeronea proved the wisdom of this advice. Similar counsel was given by
Pericles in the Peloponnesian war. Had the Athenians attempted to meet
the invading army in the field, they must inevitably have been defeated
in the early period of the war.]

Nor is it enough to adopt these resolutions and oppose him by warlike
measures: you must on calculation and on principle abhor his advocates
here, remembering that it is impossible to overcome your enemies abroad,
until you have chastised those who are his ministers within the city.
Which, by Jupiter and all the gods, you can not and will not do! You
have arrived at such a pitch of folly or madness or--I know not what to
call it: I am tempted often to think, that some evil genius is driving
you to ruin--for the sake of scandal or envy or jest or any other cause,
you command hirelings to speak, (some of whom would not deny themselves
to be hirelings,) and laugh when they abuse people. And this, bad as it
is, is not the worst: you have allowed these persons more liberty for
their political conduct than your faithful counselors: and see what
evils are caused by listening to such men with indulgence. I will
mention facts that you will all remember.

In Olynthus some of the statesmen were in Philip's interest, doing every
thing for him; some were on the honest side, aiming to preserve their
fellow-citizens from slavery. Which party now destroyed their country?
or which betrayed the cavalry, [Footnote: After Olynthus was besieged by Philip, various sallies were made from the city, some of which were
successful. But the treachery of Lasthenes and his accomplices ruined
all. A body of five hundred horse were led by him into an ambuscade, and
captured by the besiegers. See Appendix I.] by whose betrayal Olynthus
fell? The creatures of Philip; they that, while the city stood,
slandered and calumniated the honest counselors so effectually, that the
Olynthian people were induced to banish Apollonides.

Nor is it there only, and nowhere else, that such practice has been
ruinous. In Eretria, when, after riddance of Plutarch [Footnote: When he
was expelled by Phocion after the battle of Tamynae, B. C. 354.] and his
mercenaries, the people got possession of their city and of Porthmus,
some were for bringing the government over to you, others to Philip. His
partisans were generally, rather exclusively, attended to by the
wretched and unfortunate Eretrians, who at length were persuaded to
expel their faithful advisers. Philip, their ally and friend, sent
Hipponicus and a thousand mercenaries, demolished the walls of Porthmus,
and established three rulers, Hipparchus, Automedon, Clitarchus. Since
that he has driven them out of the country, twice attempting their
deliverance: once he sent the troops with Eurylochus, afterward those of

What need of many words? In Oreus Philip's agents were Philistides,
Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus, who now hold the government:
that was quite notorious: one Euphraeus, a man that formerly dwelt here
among you, was laboring for freedom and independence. How this man was
in other respects insulted and trampled on by the people of Oreus, were
long to tell: but a year before the capture, discovering what
Philistides and his accomplices were about, he laid an information
against them for treason. A multitude then combining, having Philip for
their paymaster, and acting under his direction, take Euphraeus off to
prison as a disturber of the public peace. Seeing which, the people of
Oreus, instead of assisting the one and beating the others to death,
with them were not angry, but said his punishment was just, and rejoiced
at it. So the conspirators, having full liberty of action, laid their
schemes and took their measures for the surrender of the city; if any of
the people observed it, they were silent and intimidated, remembering
the treatment of Euphraeus; and so wretched was their condition, that on
the approach of such a calamity none dared to utter a word, until the
enemy drew up before the walls: then some were for defense, others for
betrayal. Since the city was thus basely and wickedly taken, the
traitors have held despotic rule; people who formerly rescued them, and
were ready for any maltreatment of Euphraeus, they have either banished
or put to death; Euphraeus killed himself, proving by deed, that he had
resisted Philip honestly and purely for the good of his countrymen.

What can be the reason--perhaps you wonder--why the Olynthians and
Eretrians and Orites were more indulgent to Philip's advocates than to
their own? The same which operates with you. They who advise for the
best can not always gratify their audience, though they would; for the
safety of the state must be attended to: their opponents by the very
counsel which is agreeable advance Philip's interest. One party required
contribution; the other said there was no necessity: one were for war
and mistrust; the other for peace, until they were ensnared. And so on
for every thing else; (not to dwell on particulars;) the one made
speeches to please for the moment, and gave no annoyance; the other
offered salutary counsel, that was offensive. Many rights did the people
surrender at last, not from any such motive of indulgence or ignorance,
but submitting in the belief that all was lost, Which, by Jupiter and
Apollo, I fear will be your case, when on calculation you see that
nothing can be done. I pray, men of Athens, it may never come to this!
Better die a thousand deaths than render homage to Philip, or sacrifice
any of your faithful counselors. A fine recompense have the people of
Oreus got, for trusting themselves to Philip's friends and spurning Euphraeus! Finely are the Eretrian commons rewarded, for having driven
away your embassadors and yielded to Clitarchus! Yes; they are slaves,
exposed to the lash and the torture. Finally he spared the Olynthians,
who appointed Lasthenes to command their horse, and expelled
Apollonides! It is folly and cowardice to cherish such hopes, and, while
you take evil counsel and shirk every duty, and even listen to those who
plead for your enemies, to think you inhabit a city of such magnitude,
that you can not suffer any serious misfortune. Yea, and it is
disgraceful to exclaim on any occurrence, when it is too late, "Who
would have expected it? However--this or that should have been done, the
other left undone." Many things could the Olynthians mention now, which,
if foreseen at the time would have prevented their destruction. Many
could the Orites mention, many the Phocians, and each of the ruined
states. But what would it avail them? As long as the vessel is safe,
whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every man in turn
should exert himself, and prevent its being overturned either by
accident or design: but when the sea hath rolled over it, their efforts
are vain. And we, likewise, O Athenians, while we are safe, with a
magnificent city, plentiful resources, lofty reputation--what [Footnote:
Smead remarks here on the adroitness of the orator, who, instead of
applying the simile of the ship to the administration of the state,
which he felt that his quick-minded hearers had already done, suddenly
interrupts himself with a question, which would naturally occur to the
audience.] must we do? Many of you, [Footnote: _You_, [Greek: _oi
kathaemenoi_]. See my observations in the preface. I can not forbear
noticing the manner in which Francis translates the following [Greek:
_nae Di ero_]. "Let Jupiter be witness, with what integrity I shall
declare my opinion." The original means nothing of the kind. It is rare
that [Greek: _nae Dia_] can be translated literally with effect.
Jacobs here has _wohlan_.] I dare say, have been longing to ask.
Well then, I will tell you; I will move a resolution: pass it, if you

First, let us prepare for our own defense; provide ourselves, I mean,
with ships, money, and troops--for surely, though all other people
consented to be slaves, we at least ought to struggle for freedom. When
we have completed our own preparations and made them apparent to the
Greeks, then let us invite the rest, and send our embassadors every
where with the intelligence, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, to
the king, I say; (for it concerns his interests, not to let Philip make
universal conquest;) that, if you prevail, you may have partners of your
dangers and expenses, in case of necessity, or at all events that you
may delay the operations. For, since the war is against an individual,
[Footnote: Because a state is a permanent power; a single man is liable
to a variety of accidents, and his power terminates with his life.] not
against the collected power of a state, even this may be useful; as were
the embassies last year to Peloponnesus, and the remonstrances with
which I and Polyeuctus, that excellent man, and Hegesippus, and
Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other envoys went round, and arrested
Philip's progress, so that he neither attacked Ambracia nor started for
Peloponnesus. I say not, however, that you should invite the rest
without adopting measures to protect yourselves: it would be folly,
while you sacrifice your own interest, to profess a regard for that of
strangers, or to alarm others about the future, while for the present
you are unconcerned. I advise not this: I bid you send supplies to the
troops in Chersonesus, and do what else they require; prepare yourselves
and make every effort first, then summon, gather, instruct the rest of
the Greeks. That is the duty of a state possessing a dignity such as
yours. If you imagine that Chalcidians or Megarians will save Greece,
while you run away from the contest, you imagine wrong. Well for any of
those people, if they are safe themselves. This work belongs to you:
this privilege your ancestors bequeathed to you, the prize of many
perilous exertions. But if every one will sit seeking his pleasure, and
studying to be idle himself, never will he find others to do his work,and more than this,         I fear we shall be under the necessity of doing all that we like not at one time.     Were proxies to be had, our inactivity would have found them long ago; but they are not.

Such are the measures which I advise, which I propose: adopt them, and
even yet, I believe, our prosperity may be re-established. If any man
has better advice to offer, let him communicate it openly. Whatever you
determine, I pray to all the gods for a happy result.


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