Republic of Macedonia


 Soon after the close of the Phocian war, the attention of
Philip was called to Peloponnesus, where the dissensions
between Sparta and her old enemies afforded him an occasion
of interference. The Spartans had never abandoned their right
to the province of Messenia, which had been wrested from them
by Epaminondas; and since Thebes was no longer to be feared,
they seem to have conceived hopes of regaining their lost
power. The Argives and the Arcadians of Megalopolis were in
league with Messenia, but Sparta had her allies in the
Peloponnesus, and even Athens was suspected of favoring her
cause. It does not appear that any open hostilities had taken
place; but about this time the fears of the Messenians induced
them to solicit the alliance of Philip. He willingly promised
them his protection, and sent a body of troops into the
Peninsula. The progress which Macedonian influence was making
there having alarmed the Athenians, they sent Demosthenes with
an embassy to counteract it. He went to Messene and to Argos,
addressed the people, and pointed out the dangers, to which
all Greece was exposed by Philip's ambition. It seems that he
failed in rousing their suspicions, or they were too much
occupied by an immediate peril to heed one that appeared
remote. Philip however resented this proceeding on the part of
the Athenians, and sent an embassy to expostulate with them,
especially on the charge of bad faith and treachery which had
been preferred against him by Demosthenes. Embassadors from
Argos and Messene accompanied those of Macedon, and complained
of the connection that appeared to subsist between Athens
and Lacedaemon, hostile (they thought) to the liberties of
Peloponnesus. In answer to these complaints, Demosthenes
addressed his second Philippic to the Popular Assembly;
repeating the substance of what he had said to the
Peloponnesians, vindicating his own conduct, and denouncing
the Macedonian party at Athens. The embassy led to no immediate
result; but the influence of Demosthenes at home was increased.

In all the speeches, men of Athens, about Philip's measures and
infringements of the peace, I observe that statements made on our behalf
are thought just and generous, [Footnote: _Generous_, as regards
the Greek states, whose independence the Athenians stand up for. This
praise Demosthenes frequently claims for his countrymen, and, compared
with the rest of the Greeks, they deserved it. Leland understood the
word [Greek: _philanthropous_] in the same sense, though he
translates it _humane_. We use the term _philanthropic_ in a
sense not unlike that of the orator; but, as Leland truly observes, "the
distinction of Greek and barbarian precluded the rest of mankind from a
just share in Grecian philanthropy;" and he might have added, that their
notions of slavery were not in accordance with an enlarged humanity.
Therefore, I prefer a word of a less arrogant meaning. Jacobs:
_billig_. Francis: "filled with sentiments of exceeding
moderation."] and all who accuse Philip are heard with approbation; yet
nothing (I may say) that is proper, or for the sake of which the
speeches are worth hearing, is done. To this point are the affairs of
Athens brought, that the more fully and clearly one convicts Philip of
violating the peace with you, and plotting against the whole of Greece,
the more difficult it becomes to advise you how to act. The cause lies
in all of us, Athenians, that, when we ought to oppose an ambitious
power by deeds and actions, not by words, we men of the hustings
[Footnote: Auger has: "nous qui montons a la tribune."] shrink from our
duty of moving and advising, for fear of your displeasure, and only declaim on                      the heinousness and atrocity of Philip's conduct; you of the assembly, though  better               instructed than Philip to argue justly, or comprehend the argument of another, to check him in the execution of his designs are totally unprepared. The result is inevitable, I imagine, and perhaps just. You each succeed better in what you are busy and earnest about; Philip in actions, you in words. If you are still satisfied with using the better arguments, it is an easy matter, and there is no trouble: but if we are to take measures for the correction of these evils, to prevent their insensible progress, and the rising up of a mighty power, against which we could have no defense, then our course of deliberation is not the same as formerly; the orators, and you that hear them, must prefer good and salutary counsels to those which are easy and agreeable.

First, men of Athens, if any one regards without uneasiness the might
and dominion of Philip, and imagines that it threatens no danger to the
state, or that all his preparations are not against you, I marvel, and
would entreat you every one to hear briefly from me the reasons, why I
am led to form a contrary expectation, and wherefore I deem Philip an
enemy; that, if I appear to have the clearer foresight, you may hearken
to me; if they, who have such confidence and trust in Philip, you may
give your adherence to them.

Thus then I reason, Athenians. What did Philip first make himself master
of after the peace? Thermopylae and the Phocian state. Well, and how
used he his power? He chose to act for the benefit of Thebes, not of
Athens. Why so? Because, I conceive, measuring his calculations by
ambition, by his desire of universal empire, without regard to peace,
quiet, or justice, he saw plainly, that to a people of our character and
principles nothing could he offer or give, that would induce you for
self-interest to sacrifice any of the Greeks to him. He sees that you,
having respect for justice, dreading the infamy of the thing, and
exercising proper forethought, would oppose him in any such attempt as
much as if you were at war: but the Thebans he expected (and events
prove him right) would, in return for the services done them, allow him
in every thing else to have his way, and, so far from thwarting or
impeding him, would fight on his side if he required it. From the same
persuasion he befriended lately the Messenians and Argives, which is the
highest panegyric upon you, Athenians; for you are adjudged by these
proceedings to be the only people incapable of betraying for lucre the
national rights of Greece, or bartering your attachment to her for any
obligation or benefit. And this opinion of you, that (so different) of
the Argives and Thebans, he has naturally formed, not only from a view
of present times, but by reflection on the past. For assuredly he finds
and hears that your ancestors, who might have governed the rest of
Greece on terms of submitting to Persia, not only spurned the proposal,
when Alexander, [Footnote: Alexander of Macedon, son of Amyntas, was
sent by Mardonius, the Persian commander, to offer the most favorable
terms to the Athenians, if they would desert the cause of the Greeks.
The Spartans at the same time sent an embassy, to remind them of their
duty. The spirited reply which the Athenians made to both embassies is
related by Herodotus. The Thebans submitted to Xerxes, and fought
against the Greeks at the battle of Plataea. The Argives were neutral,
chiefly from jealousy of Sparta. They demanded half the command of the
allied army, as a condition of their assistance, but this could not be
complied with.] this man's ancestor, came as herald to negotiate, but
preferred to abandon their country and endure any suffering, and
thereafter achieved such exploits as all the world loves to mention,
though none could ever speak them worthily, and therefore I must be
silent; for their deeds are too mighty to be uttered [Footnote: The
simple [Greek: _eipein_] in the original is more forcible than if
it had been [Greek: _epainein_], or the like. Compare Shakspeare,
Coriolanus, Act ii. sc. 2.

I shall lack voice: the deeds of Coriolanus
Should not be uttered feebly----
For this last
Before and in Corioli, let me say,
I can not speak him home.]

in words. But the forefathers of the Argives and Thebans, they either
joined the barbarian's army, or did not oppose it; and therefore he
knows that both will selfishly embrace their advantage, without
considering the common interest of the Greeks. He thought then, if he
chose your friendship, it must be on just principles; if he attached
himself to them he should find auxiliaries of his ambition. This is the
reason of his preferring them to you both then and now. For certainly he
does not see them with a larger navy than you, nor has he acquired an
inland empire and renounced that of the sea and the ports, nor does he
forget the professions and promises on which he obtained the peace.

Well, it may be said, he knew all this, yet he so acted, not from
ambition or the motives which I charge, but because the demands of the
Thebans were more equitable than yours. Of all pleas, this now is the
least open to him. He that bids the Lacedaemonians resign Messene, how
can he pretend, when he delivered Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans,
to have acted on a conviction of justice?

But, forsooth, he was compelled,--this plea remains--he made concessions
against his will, being surrounded by Thessalian horse and Theban
infantry. Excellent! So of his intentions they talk; he will mistrust
the Thebans; and some carry news about, that he will fortify Elatea. All
this he intends and will intend I dare say; but to attack the
Lacedaemonians on behalf of Messene and Argos he does not intend; he
actually sends mercenaries and money into the country, and is expected
himself with a great force. The Lacedaemonians, who are enemies of
Thebes, he overthrows; the Phocians, whom he himself before destroyed,
will he now preserve?

And who can believe this? I can not think that Philip, either if he was
forced into his former measures, or if he were now giving up the
Thebans, would pertinaciously oppose their enemies; his present conduct
rather shows that he adopted those measures by choice. All things prove
to a correct observer, that his whole plan of action is against our
state. And this has now become to him a sort of necessity. Consider. He
desires empire: he conceives you to be his only opponents. He has been
for some time wronging you, as his own conscience best informs him,
since, by retaining what belongs to you, he secures the rest of his
dominion: had he given up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he deemed himself
unsafe at home. He knows therefore, both that he is plotting against
you, and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have
intelligence, he thinks you must hate him; he is alarmed, expecting some
disaster, if you get the chance, unless he hastes to prevent you.
Therefore he is awake, and on the watch against us; he courts certain
people, Thebans, and people in Peloponnesus of the like views, who from
cupidity, he thinks, will be satisfied with the present, and from
dullness of understanding will foresee none of the consequences. And yet
men of even moderate sense might notice striking facts, which I had
occasion to quote to the Messenians and Argives, and perhaps it is
better they should be repeated to you.

Ye, men of Messene, said I, how do ye think the Olynthians would have
brooked to hear any thing against Philip at those times, when he
surrendered to them Anthemus, which all former kings of Macedonia
claimed, when he cast out the Athenian colonists and gave them Potidaea,
taking on himself your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy? Think
ye they expected such treatment as they got, or would have believed it
if they had been told? Nevertheless, said I, they, after enjoying for a                                             

short time the land of others, are for a long time deprived by him of
their own, shamefully expelled, not only vanquished, but betrayed by one
another and sold. In truth, these too close connections with despots are
not safe for republics. The Thessalians, again, think ye, said I, when
he ejected their tyrants, and gave back Nicaea and Magnesia, they
expected to have the decemvirate [Footnote: Thessaly was anciently
divided into four districts, each called a _tetras_, and this, as
we learn from the third Philippic, was restored soon after the
termination of the Sacred war. The object of Philip in effecting this
arrangement was, no doubt, to weaken the influence of the great
Thessalian families by a division of power; otherwise the Pheraean
tyranny might have been exchanged for an oligarchy powerful enough to be
independent of Macedonia. The decemvirate here spoken of (if the text be
correct) was a further contrivance to forward Philip's views; whether we
adopt Leland's opinion, that each tetrarchy was governed by a council of
ten, or Schaefer's, that each city was placed under ten governors.
Jacobs understands the word _decemvirate_ not to refer to any
positive form of government, but generally to designate a
_tyranny_, such as that which the Lacedaemonians used to introduce
into conquered cities. So, for example, the Romans might have spoken of
a decemvirate after the time of Appius. However this be, Philip seems to
have contrived that the ruling body, whether in the tetrarchy or the
decadarchy, should be his own creatures. Two of them, Eudicus and Simus,
are particularly mentioned by Demosthenes as traitors.] which is now
established? or that he who restored the meeting at Pylae [Footnote:
_Pylae_, which signifies _gates_, was a name applied by the
Greeks to divers passes, or defiles, but especially to the pass of
_Thermopylae_, which opened through the ridges of Mount Oeta into
the country of the Epicnemidian Locrians, and was so called from the hot
sulphureous springs that gushed from the foot of the mountain.] would
take away their revenues? Surely not. And yet these things have
occurred, as all mankind may know. You behold Philip, I said, a
dispenser of gifts and promises: pray, if you are wise, that you may
never know him for a cheat and a deceiver. By Jupiter, I said, there are
manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities, as
ramparts, walls, trenches, and the like: these are all made with hands,
and require expense; but there is one common safeguard in the nature of
prudent men, which is a good security for all, but especially for
democracies against despots. What do I mean? Mistrust. Keep this, hold
to this; preserve this only, and you can never be injured. What do ye
desire? Freedom. Then see ye not that Philip's very titles are at
variance therewith? Every king and despot is a foe to freedom, an
antagonist to laws. Will ye not beware, I said, lest, seeking
deliverance from war, you find a master?

They heard me with a tumult of approbation; and many other speeches they
heard from the ambassadors, both in my presence and afterward; yet none
the more, as it appears, will they keep aloof from Philip's friendship
and promises. And no wonder, that Messenians and certain Peloponnesians
should act contrary to what their reason approves; but you, who
understand yourselves, and by us orators are told, how you are plotted
against, how you are inclosed! you, I fear, to escape present exertion,
will come to ruin ere you are aware. So doth the moment's case and
indulgence prevail over distant advantage.

As to your measures, you will in prudence, I presume, consult hereafter
by yourselves. I will furnish you with such an answer as it becomes the
assembly to decide upon.

[_Here the proposed answer was read_]

[Footnote: Whether this was moved by the orator himself, or formally
read as his motion by the officer of the assembly, does not appear.]

It were just, men of Athens, to call the persons who brought those
promises, on the faith whereof you concluded peace. For I should never
have submitted to go as ambassador, and you would certainly not have
discontinued the war, had you supposed that Philip, on obtaining peace,
would act thus; but the statements then made were very different. Ay,
and others you should call. Whom? The men who declared--after the peace,
when I had returned from my second mission, that for the oaths, when,
perceiving your delusion, I gave warning, and protested, and opposed the
abandonment of Thermopylae and the Phocians--that I, being a
water-drinker, [Footnote: It was Philocrates who said this. There were
many jokes against Demosthenes as a water-drinker.] was naturally a
churlish and morose fellow, that Philip, if he passed the straits, would
do just as you desired, fortify Thespiae and Plataea, humble the
Thebans, cut through the Chersonese [Footnote: This peninsula being
exposed to incursions from Thrace, a plan was conceived of cutting
through the isthmus from Pteleon to Leuce-Acte, to protect the Athenian
settlements. See the Appendix to this volume, on the Thracian
Chersonese.] at his own expense, and give you Oropus and Euboea in
exchange for Amphipolis. All these declarations on the hustings I am
sure you remember, though you are not famous for remembering injuries.
And, the most disgraceful thing of all, you voted in your confidence,
that this same peace should descend to your posterity; so completely
were you misled. Why mention I this now, and desire these men to be
called? By the gods, I will tell you the truth frankly and without
reserve. Not that I may fall a-wrangling, to provoke recrimination
before you, [Footnote: Similarly Auger: "Ce n'est pas pour m'attirer les
invectives de mes anciens adversaires en les invectivant moi-meme."
Jacobs otherwise: _Nicht um durch Schmahungen mir auf gleiche Weise
Gehor bei Euch zu verschaffen_. But I do not think that [Greek:
_emauto logon poiaeso_] can bear the sense of [Greek: _logon
tuchoimi_], "get a hearing for myself." And the orator's object is,
not so much to sneer at the people by hinting that they are ready to
hear abuse, as to deter his opponents from retaliation, or weaken its
effect, by denouncing their opposition as corrupt. Leland saw the
meaning: "Not that, by breaking out into invectives, I may expose myself
to the like treatment."] and afford my old adversaries a fresh pretext
for getting more from Philip, nor for the purpose of idle garrulity. But
I imagine that what Philip is doing will grieve you hereafter more than
it does now. I see the thing progressing, and would that my surmises
were false; but I doubt it is too near already. So when you are able no
longer to disregard events, when, instead of hearing from me or others
that these measures are against Athens, you all see it yourselves, and
know it for certain, I expect you will be wrathful and exasperated. I
fear then, as your embassadors have concealed the purpose for which they
know they were corrupted, those who endeavor to repair what the others
have lost may chance to encounter your resentment; for I see it is a
practice with many to vent their anger, not upon the guilty, but on
persons most in their power. While therefore the mischief is only coming
and preparing, while we hear one another speak, I wish every man, though
he knows it well, to be reminded, who it was [Footnote: He means
Aeschines.] persuaded you to abandon Phocis and Thermopylae, by the
command of which Philip commands the road to Attica and Peloponnesus,
and has brought it to this, that your deliberation must be, not about
claims and interests abroad, but concerning the defense of your home and
a war in Attica, which will grieve every citizen when it comes, and
indeed it has commenced from that day. Had you not been then deceived,
there would be nothing to distress the state. Philip would certainly
never have prevailed at sea and come to Attica with a fleet, nor would
he have marched with a land-force by Phocis and Thermopylae: he must
either have acted honorably, observing the peace and keeping quiet, or
been immediately in a war similar to that which made him desire the
peace. Enough has been said to awaken recollection. Grant, O ye gods, it
be not all fully confirmed! I would have no man punished, though death
he may deserve, to the damage and danger of the country.


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